Hanteng Liao at the OII

When the remixing free culture movement (e.g. Wikipedia and Linux) contributes to the Internet culture, the Shanzhai culture (e.g. Chinese knockoff and pirated brands and goods) could also be found in the latest the “Green Dam- Youth Escort” software. Judging from the results re-engineered by some tech-savvy users in China, what is inside the “Green Dam- Youth Escort” software contains elements that will surprise many of us.

It is difficult to imagine why any black list can contain the following websites in the same category (see the source):

• americangirl.com
• news.cybersiter.com
• virgin-boys
• amnesty.org

It is the ultimate remix of a lifestyle brand for young American girls, a well-known child-protection filtering software company, a taboo word for child pornography, and …. a pro-human rights international NGO.

Thus, the hackers who re-engineered this software speculates that it is a black list for the Green Dam software.   It is ironic that this software actually contains traces of Cybersitter’s work.  The potential copyright/copyleft infringement could also be found in its using of one open source project, OpenCV.   Please see the section of copyright infringement in the collaboratively-written report.

Hence, the “Green Dam- Youth Escort” software is the ultimate technical, political and legal art form that remixes Beijing’s  patrimonial, paranoia, control-freak political sentiments with Chinese local software industry’s “Shanzhai” style of creativity.   It is sometimes hard to distinguish the two from this software.   The combination is, as the Internet users in China who re-engineered it, absurd and funny!

Taiwanese media (arguably the most liberal in East Asia with regards to gay and lesbian culture) has already criticized the software also filters proper gay and lesbian websites, which is also substantiated by the  re-engineered evidence of gay/lesbian list.  The re-engineers are reluctant to comment, saying they have little clues to comment.   I am sure that human rights group in Taiwan will like to collaborate.  If so, another kind of remix culture will be formed through this process to counter the the “Green Dam- Youth Escort” software, which symbolizes an absurd kind of remix culture: Beijing’s political control freak and Beijing’s indigenuos Shangzhai-based software industry.

Still, there is one re-engineered list of urls that is open to interpretation.  The list contains financial and market information providers.  It is believed to be part of the black list of the “Green Dam- Youth Escort” software.  So, what is your take in why Beijing want to filter such information for the youth in China?

• Is it the ultimate war between the Chinese Green Dam against American Greenbacks?
• Is it the Green Dam built to fend off the financial crisis originated in US?
• Is it to difficult for the Youth in China to understand the financial figures and reports?
• Is the current financial figures and reports too “obscene” for care-free children?
• Is it to prevent the parents to access the financial transparency practice in the West?

Note that www.sec.gov is included in the list.

It has been more than one and half year (17 months) since I formally started my DPhil project.  My research concern has not been changed but the analytic tools (including concepts and methods) have been shifted a bit.  The concerns on nationalism is clearly pushed a little bit into the background, and the concerns on Internet governance on cultural, political (and thus historical) content in Chinese-written Internet should be much more tangible and clear.  Simply put, I may tend to believe at this moment that the indepedent variable is governance rather than nationalism.  Or it is just because I start more from the empirical evidence that can be collected and analyzed on the case of Chinese-written encyclopedia and less on the theoretical debate on the nature of China’s nationalism online, which is too entrenched in the politics and international relationship literatre.

I thus mark this mental milestone by changing the short biography of myself, and leaving the old biography as below:

Continue reading ‘A (mental) milestone for my PhD project’

Much as I appreciate and support the pragmatic approach of “digital-era governance” (DEG), I still find something still missing there about the Internet.  I have found it lately.  It is the re-enchantment part of the Internet, that is to say, the potential to exert magical influence over the people, especially emotionally.

Indeed, internet techonologies can be instrumental, rationalised, and thus blasé.  However, it can also be spontaneous, emotional and imaginative.  It is exactly the “Pied Piper of Hamelin” part of the internet I want to explore here.

It is exactly two very emotionally powerful Internet events that drive me to write this essay.  One is the viral video “Where the Hell is Matt?” and another is the recent speech “Always on the side of the egg” (Chinese translation here) by Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami (村上春樹).

First of all, the re-enchantment in Internet could be lies or fictions.  Murakami has pointed out truth could be very elusive, and it is exactly why “making up good lies” is so important for us to discern “where the truth-lies within us”:

In most cases, it is virtually impossible to grasp a truth in its original form and depict it accurately. This is why we try to grab its tail by luring the truth from its hiding place, transferring it to a fictional location, and replacing it with a fictional form. In order to accomplish this, however, we first have to clarify where the truth-lies within us, within ourselves. This is an important qualification for making up good lies.

I guess anyone in the beginning of a relationship will tell you the similar thing   The similar thing could also be applied to religious belief or the “Pied Piper of Hamelin“.  They all could be regarded as lies and fictions that are emotionally powerful and persuasive.  They may not stand up to the scrutiny of rationality and seriousness.  But somehow they have the quality to enchant people.

Now, should we blame people for being so gullible and not rational enough?  Sometimes we should, but sometimes we should not.  For the former we have the improved rationality of “digital-era governance” (DEG), which is outside the discussion of this short essay.  For the latter we have this strange viral video “Where the Hell is Matt?”, which shows the enchantment potentials of online activities.

“Matt”, known as Dancing Matt, features in almost every scene of the video showing him dancing in major landmarks and street scenes around the world.  In the video, his dancing skill is consistently limited, but his passion is not bounded by geography.  Sometimes he dances alone, but increasingly some dog, some go-go-bar girl, and later flocks of people come to dance with him, mostly in public space.

Dancing has been professionalized, privatized, commercialized in our lives for so long.  The ancient dance of communities seem to be lost.  Thus, the spontaneity of the people joining in seems enchanting, as perhaps inherited from our ancestors’ dancing around the fire.  Of course such spontaneous dancing has been also commercialized for commercials.  Still somehow people still want to be enchanted.  (The similar thing could be said about love.)

Somehow, the Dancing Matt video has enchanted so many of the people online.  With my literary analytic skills, I can argue that it is because of the background music, the simple universal joy from so many places of the world, the globalized ideal (cosmopolitanism) that humanity can transcend all kinds of differences, and all these little tricks that makes people tick.  They could be read as powerfully manipulative.

That is why it is hailed as “a near-perfect piece of Internet art“.  It is also a hoax.

People then have two choices in front of them.  Either they have to admitted that they are fooled and deceived in believing such kind of things can actually happen.  Thus they become disillusioned, disenchanted and blasé.  Or they can deconstruct the fake part and claim that “they knew it” in the beginning.

Any other way to see this piece of hoax?

It might be a good idea to understand how such a form of trickery, and stop to become a sucker again.  Or better yet, it might be executable idea to practice it to make other people a bunch of suckers.

That’s all?  I want to push it a bit further, with the below quote by the video maker:

The world is far more dangerous, cruel and unfriendly for something like that to happen.  (But) people bought it.

My question will be, to what extent, Internet is far less dangerous, cruel and unfriendly for something like to happen?  To what extent, people want to buy it so desperately?  To what extent, people are willing to take the risk of being deceived (and thus hurt) to believe again?  To what extent, people want to believe?

Is it exactly this kind of assumed “good faith” that allures so many people into strangers in some chat room, on some talk page of a Wikipedia entry?  Is it exactly people’s hidden desire to meet nice strangers that initiates many unexpected stories online that never happen offline?  Is it the imagination that people want to find a place that is less dangerous, cruel and unfriendly?  Is it why people may have sympathy for the eggs when they are destined to be broke against the wall?

As the Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami will probably tell you in the speech, it is not about the rationality that may stop people from lying or becoming the victims of deception, but rather the empathy in siding “on the side the egg” against the solid hard wall of the “system”, even when knowing that the fragile belief in humanity may be easily destroyed by the system we create.

Internet can host many activities of deception.  Of course, we may need improved rationality such as “digital-era governance” (DEG) to stop lying politicians, financial criminals, untrustworthy sellers, manipulative ex-boyfriends, etc to deceive us.   At the same time, we also need desperately some kind of irrational belief, sometimes siding “on the side the egg“, sometimes simply just dancing after watching the video “Where the Hell is Matt?”  It is exactly why the video maker asks the audience to dance with him in a speech.  It is why the audience, though understanding the fact that the video is a hoax, chooses to dance along.  It is the Internet’s potential to change.  It is our common desire to believe (or believe again if one is blasé of the reality out there).

按：　此文原為在zh.wikipedia(中文維基討論區)的討論文章，因最近英國過濾某一維基百科網頁, 而非封鎖整個維基百科網站的相關新聞，重貼於此。

Continue reading ‘中文維基、長城、網際網路論壇(Internet Governance Forum)、及 網際網路權利法案 (The Internet Bill of Rights)’

中文網路上現在有不少關於所謂「英國ISP封鎖維基百科」或「維基百科詞條因涉及兒童色情遭英國封殺」的報導，但這新聞的報導方式容易讓人誤解，認為國家政府也都在過濾或封鎖網站，所以暗示的也就是說，天下烏鴉一般黑，網站封鎖到處都有，沒什麼大不了的。但我還是要重申我稍早在中文維基百科討論串的留言，過濾政權是各國有沒錯，但其合法性、透明性及正當性差別很大（見此文）。

先說事實及潛在差別（英國和中國的不同）

1. 英國過濾某一維基百科網頁，而非封鎖整個維基百科網站。（中國很長一段時間是直接封鎖整個網站）
2. 英國過濾的機制是透明可受公評。（中國過濾是不給理由的，封就封）
3. 英國過濾的執行單位雖也是ＩＳＰ，但能過濾的內容是法律定義的內容，特別是兒童色情，是由慈善團體／非政府組織IWF建立一個『公開的』黑名單，交給英國的ISP來實施過濾，通常這黑名單的決策過程是IWF根據網友舉報，評估是否違法英國法律（兒童色情為非法內容），並公佈之。若被過濾的單位或內容所有者不滿，可以申訴甚至訴諸法律行動。（中國過濾決策過程不透明，黑名單的列表及法律依據也未明列，也沒有主管的單位承認有黑名單）
4. 維基百科在民主國家被過濾，通常較少見，而且多為單一條目，如兒童色情或納粹言論等指控，但其結果通常是正面的，也就是說最後多以撤銷過濾收場。（中國過濾維基百科最早是整個網站過濾，而中國政府及司法單位並未像其他民主國家一樣，提供任何解釋或申訴討論的公開管道）
5. 在民主國家的網民或有不清楚所謂合法的過濾機制，而發言認為該國家變成和中國一樣，這樣的不滿雖然不一定符合事實，但能夠形成足夠的言論壓力，促使其民主國家的政府提出必要解釋以維持言論自由。（並不是他們就接受全世界政府就和中國政府一樣，都在過濾，所以沒什麼大不了的）

對網路言論過濾的進一步討論，我於稍早的『言論特區』(special speech zones)的『分區科技』(zoning technologies)文章中，有一個統一的初步理論建構。利用該理論比較能跳脫不必要的犬儒主義(天下烏鴉一般黑，網站封鎖到處都有)，並實際瞭解政府如何對網路言論以『分區科技』進行管制，並進一步討論其合法性、透明性及正當性。

Rebecca MacKinnon’s empirical research on Chinese Blog Service Providers’ censorship pattern is arguably the first systematic attempt to map what I call “special speech zones”(SSZs). By special speech zones I mean areas (virtual or physical) set aside by authorities or hosts where certain speech is allowed or disallowed. While MacKinnon aims to map out which content items are allowed or disallowed in which major Chinese blog hosting sites, she has in effect initiated a “cat-chase-mouse” game of exposing the special speech zones.

“Cat-Chase-Mouse” Games

MacKinnon is cautious in not disclosing the exact names of the 15 tested blog hosting sites from “the most liberal” to “the most restrictive” based on her 108 valid tests (see the chart of what I called “speech survival distribution” ). She is right in suggesting that “those who censor less will get in trouble with the authorities”. Thus, what is implied here is a “cat-chase-mouse” game where the authorities are the cats, blog hosting sites the bigger mother mice, and individual bloggers the smaller mice. MacKinnon’s research has the potential to show which mother mice are more protective for the smaller mice and which are more responsive to the cat’s need.

Then what is the major implication of MacKinnon’s research? She has proved indirectly that the effort of censorship is indeed outsourced from the authorities to the blog hosting sites, and thus explains to some degree the different level of censorship executed by different blog hosting sites. What is next? Without the anticipation for change, especially for the positive change, the very knowledge of such mapping efforts could be problematic. With the mapping knowledge, the cats (authorities) can better discipline the big mice (hosting sites). Then if more knowledge suggests better power for the cats, why should researchers generate such knowledge? I thus believe that the knowledge MacKinnon’s research generates must in some way empower the mice (especially individual bloggers) as well.

Like all games to be playable, the power relationship of cats and mice may be temporarily and regionally reversed if only the smaller mice (bloggers) know more about the mapping than the cat (authorities).

This is also the premise that higher level of local transparency can improve better governance, which is increasingly popular in China. It is to date the most plausible explanation for some opening up in online speech in China where some speech is tolerated because it is potentially beneficial for better governance. Another plausible explanation is simply that there is no need to regulate certain message if no one in China cares. Either way, the line has been drawn between not to kill the speech that might help good governance and to censor the speech that might be too disruptive.

Indeed, the line between tolerable and intolerable speech, as self-reported by various seasoned bloggers and Wikipedians from mainland china, is somehow drawn between the speech that helps good goverance and the noisy (disruptive) opposition to the authorities. It is also consistent with China’s mainstream critique and resistance of Taiwan’s liberal democracy. Because good governance is better than democracy, China should never emulate Taiwan’s democratisation and media liberalisation.

As a Taiwanese myself, I am aware of the power of the good governance discourse of speech tolerance. Thus, it is better not to talk about free speech in the first instance, but rather to emphasize the accepted wisdom in China that higher level of local transparency can improve better governance. Thus, for MacKinnon’s research to be useful for both policy-makers (sometimes censors) and individual bloggers in this regard, it could be championed in China as part of the effort in increasing transparency for better governance. In this regards, MacKinnon’s research could be seen as an effort to increase the transparency by exposing how speech is regulated, which may in turn promote a better governance on online speech. It is highly likely that some pro-good-governance officials in China may use MacKinnon’s research to suggest less censorship on certain topics may prove more helpful than harmful, particularly if those “liberal” blog hosting sites do indeed promote better governance and have bigger market shares than those “restrictive” ones.

It would be a game-changer success if that happens. Still, it is essential to understand the difference between seeing maps and changing maps. MacKinnon’s research sees and thus potentially may modifies the map of liberal-restrictive speech zones for both better and worse. It is still the authorities that change the map. Hence, it is necessary to develop a concept that captures the dynamics without resorting to the usual terms of “self-censorship” or “Great Firewall”, which usually are too “Chinese characteristics” and thus deemed bias.

By drawing on the metaphor of “Zoning Internet Speech” proposed by legal scholars Lessig & Resnick (1999), “zoning technologies” by anthropologist Ong (2004), the widely-known “Special Economic Zones”(SEZs), and “free speech zones” in the US, I arrive at the term of “special speech zones”.

Defining Zoning Technologies

By using the term “zoning”, the first benefit is the (seemingly) neutral sense of “divide and regulate”. Lessig & Resnick (1999) provide a legal and technical working framework to discuss how the Internet can be reregulated given the Internet’s feature of universal access. First they categorise speech into three categories: (1) speech that everyone has a right to (e.g. speech about public affairs), (2) speech that no one has a right to (e.g. child porn), and (3) speech that some have a right to but others do not (e.g. adult-only porn). Then, they argue that it is particularly difficult and controversial to regulate the third category simply because the Internet’s original design generally does not discriminate senders, content and recipients:

For when viewed across jurisdictions, most controversial speech falls into category (3) – speech that is permitted to some in some places, but not to others in other places. What constitutes “political speech” in the United States (Nazi speech) is banned in Germany; what constitutes “obscene” speech in Tennessee is permitted in Holland; what constitutes porn in Japan is child porn in the United States; what is “harmful to minors” in Bavaria is Disney in New York (395).

By pragmatically acknowledging the fact that “[e]very jurisdiction controls access to some speech”, which they call “mandatory access controls”(396), they argue that any such controls would “necessity be draconian or ineffective” online (431). While their arguments are detailed and remain sensible today, the fact that Beijing has more or less successfully established such “mandatory access controls” contradicts their suggestion that governments should lessen their traditional power regarding “harmful information” (431).

Second, Beijing’s success in zoning Internet speech could be partly explained by the practice of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China, which anthropologist Ong (2004:70) describes as part of the “zoning technologies” strategy that Beijing deploys to “economically integrate disarticulated political entities as a detour toward eventual political integration”. Although I have my doubts in the future success of “eventual political integration,” as discussed later in this essay, it is important to understand whether such economic zoning corresponds to what I called speech zoning, which leads to the third point of “free speech zones”.

“Free speech zones” (or protest zones), according to Wikipedia, is “areas set aside in public places for political activists to exercise their right of free speech in the United States”. It is exactly the controversial nature of the term that highlights the political nature of zoning technologies, which are usually hidden behind the pure economic discourse. It is then no surprise that during the 2005 WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, there were free speech zones in this Special Autonomous Region near the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen. Though the connections between “free speech zones” and “free trade zones” might be arbitrary to untrained (or unbiased) minds, the coincidence in historical development at least testifies the emergence of the larger governance strategy using “zoning technologies”. For readers who are aware the recent protest event during Beijing’s representative Chen Yunlin’s visit in Taiwan, the tendency to enclose “free speech zones” to advance “free trade zones” is both a success for zoning technologies and failure for a young democracy.

This essay thus argues that by using the metaphor of zoning technologies, instead of the usual terms of “self-censorship” or “Great Firewall”, future research on Chinese-written Internet will be better equipped conceptually to address the issues of speech regulation. First it could be used, as in Lessig & Resnick (1999), in a neutrally analytical manner in order to highlight the actual technical and legal framework of speech regulation across regions (zones). Second, it avoids the usually unwarranted Cold War politics that Tsui (2008) has critiqued as “The Great Firewall as Iron Curtain 2.0″, which only distracts the attention to the false dichotomy of communist-versus-free worlds. Third, it could be further developed, following Ong (2004), to update the debate on the effects of the zoning technologies as a whole (not just simply in economic sense) on the Chinese identity, citizenship, and political integration/competition among the Chinese-speaking regions. Fourth, for serious critical researchers and hardcore social activists, the metaphor of zoning technology provides a critical yet unified front to understand the governing technologies deployed. These technologies could be deployed spatially: from economic zones to protest zones. They could also be established online: from good governance discourse to anti-disruption (or pro-harmony) mechanism. In sum, it is particularly viable to talk about “Special Speech Zones” (SSZs) when Chinese are no strangers to “Special Economic Zones”(SEZs) and some Americans have heard of “Free Speech Zones” (FSZs).

Towards Transparent Zoning Technologies or Special Political Zones ?

The policy implications of zoning technologies’ strategy of “divide and regulate” should have two different seemingly contradictory directions. One is to take zoning as a given; another is to challenge zoning technologies with the ideal of republic or universal values.

Take MacKinnon’s empirical experiment research as an example, researchers can first ask whether there exists a correlation between “Special Speech Zones” (SSZs) and “Special Economic Zones”(SEZs). After all, all blog hosting sites need operating licenses issued by a specific body of authorities, and such a body is usually region-bound at the provincial or municipal levels. If such a correlation exists, then an argument might be made, along the good governance discourse, the economic success of SEZs may promote and require the increasing speech “openness” of SSZs. Even if such a correlation does not exist, similar arguments could still be made by strategically linking the “special” treatment in both economic and information domains, using the popular discourse that healthy markets need more and accurate information. This is a strategy to take zoning technologies as a given.

Another strategy is increasingly politically sensitive given the almost-30-year of China’s successful economic reform may meet a crossroad this year. Disagreeing with Ong (2004)’s argument that zoning technologies is flexible enough to integrate “distinct political entities such as Hong Kong and Macao, and even Taiwan and Singapore, into an emerging Chinese axis”(70), I argue that the power of zoning technologies may backfire to such a flexible approach in deploying exceptions. For example, it is hard to imagine, after the toxic milk event, people from these distinct political entities can accept the flexibility in food safety regulation across different zones. For another example, although MacKinnon’s research may be interpreted as “a flexible and creative approach to the diverse regulation of spaces and civil society” (Ong 2004:74), it can be speculated that once the citizens have the whole picture, they will either game the differentiated system or demand a unified treatment. For bloggers equipped with MacKinnon’ mapping, they can chooose either to move the less regulated spaces or to demand a transparent universal speech regulation regime under their constitution or basic laws. Unified China as a single republic (not two republics or two systems) is too powerful a discourse to continue the flexible zoning technologies without proper justification or legitimacy. Hence it would be a constant struggle between “levelling the playing field” and “uneven special speech zoning”, where levelling could be bi-directional (up or down) and zoning could be used for censorship and special speech. Either way, zoning technologies provides a versatile and resourceful metaphor to reformulate questions regarding filtering and speech regulation online in Chinese-written Internet in specific, in physical public space and virtual global space in general.

References

Lessig, L., & Resnick, P. (1999). Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model. Michigan Law Review, 98(2), 395-431.

Ong, A. (2004). The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and Variegated Sovereignty. Journal of East Asian Studies, 4(1), 69-96.

Tsui, L. (2008). Chinese Internet Research Conference » Blog Archive » The Great Firewall as Iron Curtain 2.0. In Chinese Interent Research Conference. Hong Kong. Retrieved December 7, 2008, from http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/circ/2008/06/13/the-great-firewall-as-iron-curtain-20/.

It has been established that (at least in US) the fluctuations in the unemployment rate is highly correlated with those in graduate student enrollment. What about user-generated content? Will the economic downturn and rising unemployment rate increase or decrease the user-generated content activities?

Such a question has been raised at Freakonomics. Though I personally find Andrew Keen’s suggestion that it could mean the end of free content on the internet unlikely, as the phrase “free content” in China does not necessarily mean “user-generated content”, “unprotected content”, or “un-copyrighted material”, I do believe such a question needs further reformulation. Given the dire economic situation, it is also worth the effort for a PhD student like me to suspend my day job for a moment and contribute to the “free content” here.

Let’s start with the recent news that Jerry Yang, the co-founder and CEO of Yahoo, might be unemployed before Christmas this year, at least according to the verdict of the Economist. While Yang is the symbol of first-wave Internet entrepreneur (and also a Taiwanese like me), Yahoo seems to be relatively slow to catch up with the trend of user-generated content. Of course Yahoo bought Wretch, another Taiwanese social networking website, but it seems to me a local Taiwanese website may not help Yahoo in a significant way. In contrast, Google made a better move by buying YouTube, another user-generated content website whose co-founder again is also born in Taipei.

Hence it is disheartening to see immediately that some concerned Yahoo “grass-root” shareholders has setup a blog with the title “Yang Must Go”. It was also disheartening when Yahoo had shared information with Beijing so that two dissidents in China were jailed. His later effort to compensate the dissents’ family members and fund human rights research is nice but again a bit late, long after bloggers and online forums have commented on Yahoo’s responsibility.

The irony here is that now a user-generated blog aims to make Jerry Yang unemployed.

Though I personally believe (I am probably biased because I am Taiwanese) that Jerry Yang seems to be nice, humane, not greedy and willing to repent, unlike other CEOs involved in recent economic crisis and bailout, I will not be surprised that he might be out of job this time.

So from this single case, I would rather to suggest that while people are employed and unemployed, user-generated content is here to stay. It can be used to get a job, kill time while jobless, or even get somebody fired.

公地悲劇的迷思

A Chinese Translation of “The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons”

原文: http://www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/angus250808.html

採用社羣所有制的土地、森林和漁業是走向的生態災難的不歸路？August 25, 2008 2008年8月25日

作者：伊恩安格斯　（Ian Angus） ( Originally published in , August 24, 2008) （最初發表於《社會主義之聲》Socialist Voice ，八月二十四日， 2008年）

共享資源總是被濫用及誤用？ 採用社羣所有制的土地、森林和漁業是走向的生態災難的不歸路？私有化是保護環境和結束第三世界貧困的的唯一途徑？多數經濟學家和發展規劃者會回答「是的」 ，而要求進一步說明的話，他們會引用在此議題上最具影響力的一篇文章。

此小論文刊在1968年12月的《科學》期刊上，〈公地悲劇〉（The Tragedy of the Commons）已被至少111本書精選成經典文章，使其成為最受轉載的科學文章之一。這也是最被引述的一詞，在Google搜尋引擎上的最新搜索結果約 有 302,000筆。

40年來，用世界銀行討論文件的用語來描述，此文已是「社會學家評估自然資源議題的主導典範」 (Bromley and Cernea 1989: 6) 。它一次又一次地被用來合理化掠奪原住民土地、私有化醫療及其他服務、及允許企業關於「可交易的」空氣及水污染執照、等作為。

知名的人類學家G. N. Appell（1995）認為，此文「已被擁護為聖經，讓專家及學者在規劃他人未來的實踐中，強迫他人接受他們自己的經濟及環境理性，而自己對其社會系統卻無完整的瞭解及知識。」

如同大多數神聖的經文，〈公地悲劇〉此文是常被引用但少被精讀的。以下我們將發現，雖然其文章標題聽起來既科學又權威，但一點都不夠格成為科學 。

哈丁蓋瑞特（Garrett Hardin）孵化的一個迷思

〈公地悲劇〉的作者是哈丁蓋瑞特，一位加州大學的教授，在發表此文之前是以一本生物學教科書聞名，該教科書主張要對「基因有缺陷」的人進行「生育控制」 (Hardin 1966: 707)。在其1968年發表的小論文中，他主張共享資源的社群將無法避免走向自取滅亡的道路，其結果不是財富人人共享，而是沒有任何財富。他以英格蘭農村下的公地 （commons）的故事為基礎，來支持其論點。

（「公地」一詞在英格蘭指的是在進入19世紀之前農村中，到處可見的共享的牧場、農田、森林、灌溉系統和其他資源。類似的集體農耕安排曾出現在大多數歐洲國家，迄今公地仍以各種形式存在於世界各地，特別是土著社區。

「想像一個對向所有人開放的牧場， 」哈丁說，「任何一位牧民想要擴張其牛群時會計算增加放牧數量的相關成本（所有動物的食用牧草會減少，土壤會快速流失）將會由所有的牧民平均分擔，而他將獨享有更多牛可賣的利益。」

無可避免的是，「理性牧民的結論則會是，對他本人唯一合理的選擇是，再加一些牲口。」但每一位「理性牧民」 會做一樣的結論，所以公地將會因過多牲口和過度使用而到無法養活任何牲口的地步。

哈丁像亞里士多德一樣使用「悲劇」這詞來描述一種因主角的行導而導致的，無可避免但非預料下的戲劇化後。他稱這種公地的過度使用為一種悲劇，不是因為它是可悲的，而因為它是共同使用的牧場後的無可避免必然結果。「在公地下的自由為一切帶來了毀滅。 」

證據在哪裡？

有鑑於哈丁小論文的後續影響力，令人震驚的是，他並沒有提供任何證據來支持他這席捲一切的結論。他聲稱這「悲劇」是無可避免的，但他並沒有提供任何一實質發生過的案例。哈 丁完全忽視在現實公地上實際發生的現象：由相關社羣遂行的自我管制。這樣的自我管制過程早在恩格斯（Friedrich Engels）描述「標示」（mark ，譯意應含德國早期農業社會的稱重單位及後來貨幣單位的馬克）時有說明，「標誌」是在部分前資本主義德國下以公地為基礎的社羣所採納的形式：

「耕地和牧地的使用是由社羣來監督和指導的…」

「正如同每位成員在『標示』的份額是以同樣大小來分配的，各成員在『共享標示』的使用份額也是。此使用方式仍由社羣成員作為一個整體來做決定…」

「在固定時間點，或因有必要，社羣成員會在露天相會並討論有關標示的事務，並決定相關的違規及爭議案例。」 (Engels 1892)

史學家及其他學者已廣泛地確認恩格斯對共享資源的社羣管理的相關描述。最近的研究結論摘要如下：

「實際上發生的並不是『公地悲劇 』，而是勝利：數百年來（或許數千年來，雖無法由書面記錄上確認），土地是曾經由社羣成功地管理著 。」 (Cox 1985: 60)

此種自我調節的部分過程，在英格蘭被稱為「節約效力」（stinting）：確立每個成員在公地上能放牧的牛，豬，羊等牲畜的數目上限。 這種「節約效力」避免地力的過度使用（此概念是有經驗的農民早在哈丁之前就理解的） ，並讓社羣能以其公平的概念來進行資源分配。

過份放牧的唯一顯著案例，是由英格蘭公地研究的當代專家所發現的，富有的地主故意將過多的牲口放養於公地上，為的是要讓相當窮困的鄰人無法在公地限圈（enclosure）或私有化的爭端上，失去談判籌碼。(Neeson 1993: 156)

哈丁假定農民在面對災難時無法改變他們的行為。但是，在現實世界中，小農、漁民等早已為保護資源並確保公地社羣能渡過豐收及欠收，建立起相關機構和規則。

為什麼牧民想要養更多？

哈丁的論點是從這未未經證實的宣稱開始：牧民總希望擴增牲口。「這是預料中的事，每位牧民儘可能地在公地上能養多少就養多少牛，做為一位理性的人，每位牧民力求極大化其所得。」簡言之，哈丁的結論早被其假設所決定了。「這是預料之中的事」每個牧民將嘗試極大化其牲口，而每位都會做一模一樣的事。這是一個循環論證而什麼都沒證明。

哈丁假定，人的本性是自私且不變的，而且社會僅僅是由自利的個人所組成的集合，而個人不會在意其個別行對社羣的衝擊。這種思維，隱或現，乃是主流（即支持資本家）的經濟理論的基本成份。

所 有證據（更不用說常識）都顯示，這是很荒謬的假定。人是社會的動物，而社會是遠遠超過其成員的算術總合。即使是獎勵最反社會行為的資本主義社會，也沒有鎮 壓人類合作與團結的可能。近千年來所謂的『理性牧民』並沒有將公地過份使用就已經反證哈丁的最基本假設，但是這事實並沒阻止他及其信眾在沙子構成的基礎上 架設政策的城堡。

即使牧民想要如哈丁所描述的行動，也得需要特定的條件存在才行。

得先需要一個可以賣買牛的市場，而他得將生產的重心放在該市場上，而不是在本地消費上。他得需要足夠資金來買更多的牲口及在冬季所需的飼料。他得有能力僱用工人來照顧大數量的牲口，蓋更大的牲圈等等。而且他追求利潤的慾望得大過對其所屬社群長期生存的實際利益。

總之，哈丁並沒描述，前資本主義社群的農牧民行為，他所描述的乃是資本家在資本主義經濟下運作的行為。在他口中宣稱的，會不斷摧殘共享資源的普世人性，實際上是由利潤所驅動的「成長否則滅亡」的企業行為。

私有制會更好？

會不斷摧殘共享資源的並非是普世人性，而是由利潤所驅動的「成長否則滅亡」的企業行為。這讓我們意識到哈丁論點的另一致命缺陷：除了維護公地會必然破壞自然環境的說法是毫無證據支持外，他鼓吹的私有化能拯救此悲劇的意見也是沒有根據的。再一次，他把自己的偏見當成事實：「我們得承認，我們的法律制度的私有財產制加上財產繼承權是不公正的，但在這時刻我們忍受這不公正，是為還沒有人發明更好的制度。把公地做為一種另類可行方案的想起來就可怕。不公正總比全然崩潰好。」

他 的言下之意是，私財的擁有者會更照顧好自然環境，動機是他們想保護其資產的價值。在現實中，學者及社會運動者已記錄大量的案例，說明將社群共管的土地進行 分割及私有化造成了災難性的結果。公地私有化已一次又一次地導致森林濫伐、土壤流失、地力枯竭、過份使用化肥及殺蟲劑，並摧毀生態系統。

正如同馬克思所言，自然環境需要長時間週期的生育、發展和再生，但資本主義僅要求短期回報。

「資本主義生產的整體精神是直接朝向最即時的貨幣利潤，這和農業關注的相違背，農業關注的是如何以世世代代的子民，讓生活長久的各面向的要求。最鮮明的例子是森林，森林是以或多或少社會整體利益的關懷，來進行少量的管理。」 （Marx 1998: 611n ）

恰 恰和哈丁的說法相反，共享田野及森林的社群才有很強的激勵條件去盡力保護這些資源，即使這意味著這無法最大限度提高此刻的生產量，因為得顧及到這些資源將 是要讓這社群能在未來幾世紀生存下去的必要條件。資本家則有相反的動機，正因為他們若不能將短期利潤最大化的話，將無法在商業市場上生存下去。如果乙醇燃 料可比超過百年歷史的熱帶雨林帶來最更多更快的利潤，則樹木將落地倒下。

這種專注於短期收益的思維，在近年來暢銷書上，已經達到了駭人聽聞的荒謬程 度，像Bjorn Lomborg, William Nordhaus 等等的著作。他們主張現在投資減少溫室氣體排放量是不理智的，因為其投資回報太慢，遠在未來。其他的投質會提供更好更快的回報。

社群管理並不是保護共享資源的必然成功可靠方案：有社群管理不當而使公地遭過度使用而滅絕。但沒有一個以公地為基礎的社群，將資本主義內建的追求短期利益動機，放在未來世代的福祉之上。

政治上方便的迷思

〈公地悲劇〉真正可怕的地方不是其缺乏實證或邏輯，學術期刊中有研究粗糙論證草率的文章不是新鮮事。令人震驚的是，這篇反對改革的胡謅竟被擁為分析人類苦難和 環境破壞源由的精妙分析，而被所謂的專家採納成為其社會政策支持的基礎，這包括各國政府和聯合國機構中的經濟學家及環境保護專家。儘管一次又一次被反駁，此文迄今仍被用來支持私有財產制和不受控制的市場，稱其為啟動經濟增長的不二法門。

哈 丁論點的成就，反映的是其以偽科學的方式來解釋全球貧困及不平等現象的效果，但這解釋並不質疑主流的社會及政治秩序。該論點強化掌權者的偏見： 儘管該論點有一堆邏輯和事實錯誤，但比不上（對有錢人）非常有吸引力的假設，窮人應為自己的貧窮負起責任。事實上，哈丁的論點也將生態破壞的後果歸咎於窮 人，對這些掌權者來說的是採用此文的額外獎勵。

在世界各地土著和其他被壓迫人民表達不滿情緒，以及第三世界反帝運動興起的時候，哈丁的小論文已被廣泛用來作為一種意識形態式的回應。

「哈丁的迷思在1970年被集結的新自由主義的反動勢力拾起，而他的小論文成為世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織政策的科學基礎：限圈公地並私有化公有財產。…口號 十分鮮明：我們絕不能把地球看成一個 『共享財庫 』 我們得貪婪且無情，否則人類將滅亡。」 (Boal 2007)

在加拿大，保守黨政治說客引用並延伸哈丁的政治小冊子，來解釋加拿大原住民保留區貧困的原因，來主張要更進一步拆解土著社區。由具有影響力的弗雷澤學院出版的一研究報告敦促將原住民保留區土地私有化：

「 這大片的土地，與其伴隨的自然資源，將永遠無法給加拿大原住民最大的福祉，除非改變其現行受政治管理的集體財產制。 … 集體財產是通往貧窮的道路，而私人財產是通往繁榮的道徑。」 (Fraser 2002: 16-17)

這不僅僅是右翼的假惺惺或扭捏作態。一直拒絕簽署聯合國原住民權利宣言的加拿大聯邦政府，在2007年宣佈要「在原住民保留區發展並推廣個人財產制」，並僅僅為這政策成立了一個3億加元的基金。

在哈丁想像的世界中，貧窮和近百年來的種族主義、殖民主義和剝削沒有任何關係：貧困在任何時間和地點，都是不可避免的、是自然的，是不變永恆的人性的產品。 是窮人自作自受，生一堆小孩並抱著自我毀滅的集體主義緊緊不放。

公地悲劇是一個好用的政治神話 — — 冠冕堂皇的似科學解釋，說明在主導的世界秩序之外，沒有任何替代方案。

若把那些不必要陳詞濫調刪去，哈丁小論文主張的是，毫無實據的，人類是生物學及市場下的無助戰俘。除非對人們加諸限制，我們將不可避免地為幾文的額外利潤，破壞我們自己的社區和環境。我們沒有任何辦法讓世界更好或更公正。

在1844年恩格斯把類似的論點描述為「是褻瀆人與自然法則的噁心言詞。 」這評價完全適用公地悲劇的迷思。

（伊恩安格斯 Ian Angus 是氣候與資本主義主編和社會主義之聲的副主編）

引用文獻 Works Cited

Appell, G. N. 1993. “Hardin’s Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions.”

Boal, Iain. 2007. “Interview: Specters of Malthus: Scarcity, Poverty, Apocalypse.” CounterPunch, September 11, 2007.

Bromley, Daniel W. and Cernea Michael M. 1989. “The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies.” World Bank Discussion Paper.

Cox, Susan Jane Buck. 1985. “No Tragedy on the Commons.” Environmental Ethics 7.

Engels, Friedrich. 1892. “The Mark.”

Engels, Friedrich. 1844. Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy.

Fraser Institute. 2002. Individual Property Rights on Canadian Indian Reserves.

Hardin, Garrett. 1966. Biology: Its Principles and Implications. Second edition. San Francisco. W.H. Freeman & Co.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.”

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1998. Marx EngelsCollected Works Vol. 37 (Capital, Vol. 3). New York: International Publishers

Neeson, J.M. 1993. Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820. Cambridge University Press.

The Chinese governmental website just released a photo without too much comments, on the meeting between Jimmy Wales (one of the Wikipedia founders) and Mr. Tsai, the deputy director of State Council Information Office (国务院新闻办副主任).

What did they talk about? Please fill me in!

Source:  国新办副主任蔡名照会见美国维基百科创始人

(in order to understand the endless remaking of the past in the name of progress)

The significance of search engines and encyclopedias may be too obvious for heavy Internet users. Still why and how they are important to academia needs more justification.

The issue of temporal significance is highlighted most frequently when the following questions are raised: “What if Google no longer dominates the search engine market?” “What if Wikipedia projects ceases to exist?” Then the obvious question follows: “Why bother studying them for historical and political implications?” “Are they just like another hit songs of the year?” “Does they matter at all?”

For politics and history scholars, I now have the tentative answer ready for discussion. Exactly because nowadays the information comes and goes, because the valuable information today will become unwanted information bytes of ruin next year, it is all the important for us to understand how search engines and online encyclopedias has flashed out the most valuable information waiting to be recycled, archived, or just simply “updated” in forgetful Web. It is very possible that search engine and online encyclopedia may not exist after ten years or so (but my DPhil thesis may possibly stays in the Oxford library, if it is ever finished), but the value of my research should not rely on the existence of my research subjects, but rather rely on the current larger socio-historical context that we are in. I shall call it “search keyword and encyclopedia entry” project as Walter Benjamin studied shopping “Arcade” project. Sharing the similar philosophy of history, the project is not only about what the bits and pieces of information ruins can tell us about current situation, but also how the storm of progress is embodied in the artifacts of search engines and online encyclopedias.

Literally, it is a project based on the worldview that Internet is a continuous project of modernity as “the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent”(Baudelaire).

Indeed, the experience with search engines and online encyclopedias may be deceptively “ephemeral, fleeting, and contingent.” The same term may generate different search results and encyclopedia content on different days. They are moving targets. Costly to research. Shaky to make a solid argument. Seemingly pointless in generalizing.

Not so quick. As Hellsten et al. (2006) empirically shows how search engines “rewrite the past” by favoring updated information and thus forgetting the ruin of information within an endless updating cycles. This leads to a generally true statement:

Search engines remember (the new) and forget (the old).

Since search engines favor updated “new” information, the old must be re-plied, re-edited, re-used, re-linked, or even re-mixed in order to get attention. In user-generated environment, it is even truer. The old needs to be re-discovered and re-improved so that it will not be forgotten by search engines.

In this regards, online user-generated encyclopedias are favored by search engines with a good reason:

Search engines favors user-generated encyclopedias because of constant updating.

The incremental nature of wiki beats that of blogs here. Old blog entry become ruins, sometimes littered with spam links, further going downhills in the penalty of being ignored by search engines. Old wiki entry can become ruins as well, but a simple spell check or small correction by anyone in the content can restore its rankings in the attention span of search engines.

In addition, before the dreams of advanced semantic matching or image matching are realised, the clumsy keyword made of a string of symbols within/across langugage(s) still dominate the information ecology of search engines. Again, the encyclopedia organization nature beats other websites in keyword gaming in search results. The supposed-to-be-outdated indexical nature of encyclopedias (i.e. the title of entry) fit nicely into the keywords. The relationship between encyclopedia entry title and search keywords reminds us the connections between libraries catalogs, yellow books, dictionaries, etc. with the current search interface. This leads to the basic argument that I try to champion:

How a thing is termed in symbols (culturally and linguistically) influence the way search engines and encyclopedias organizes these terms and thus things.

Again, before the arrival of smooth and seamless connection of semantics (I wonder if that will ever happen), how we track, trace, and thus enable certain connections and/or infections between terms across communities, institutions, and nations is a necessary task in itself, in order to understand and capture the endless remaking of the past in the name of progress.